

---

***Miriam Schoenfield***

---

Massachusetts Institute of Technology  
Department of Linguistics and Philosophy  
77 Massachusetts Avenue 32D-808  
Cambridge MA, 02139

*E-mail:* mschoenfieldphil@gmail.com

---

**Areas of Specialization and Competence**

---

AOS: Epistemology

AOC: Metaethics, Philosophy of Race and Gender, Logic

---

**Employment**

---

Associate Professor – Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Fall 2017-current

Bersoff Fellow – New York University

Fall 2015-Spring 2017

Assistant Professor – The University of Texas at Austin

Fall 2012 – Spring 2015

---

**Education**

---

Ph.D. in Philosophy

Dissertation: *Imprecision in Normative Domains*

Roger White (chair)

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (2007 – 2012)

B.A. in Philosophy with Highest Honors,

in Mathematics with Honors,

in Neuroscience

*summa cum laude*

Brandeis University (2002 – 2006)

---

**Publications - Refereed**

---

“Meditations on Beliefs Formed Arbitrarily”

Forthcoming in *Oxford Studies in Epistemology*

Winner of the Marc Sanders Prize in Epistemology

“Permissivism and the Value of Rationality: A Challenge to the Uniqueness Thesis”

Forthcoming in *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*

Winner of the Young Epistemologist Prize 2017

- “An Accuracy Based Approach to Higher Order Evidence”  
*Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 2018 96(3): 690-715
- “Conditionalization does not (in general) Maximize Expected Accuracy”  
*Mind* 2017 126(504): 1155-1187
- “The Accuracy and Rationality of Imprecise Credences”  
*Noûs* 2017 51(4): 667-685
- “Bridging Rationality and Accuracy”  
*The Journal of Philosophy* 2015 112(2): 633-657
- “Moral Vagueness is Ontic Vagueness”  
*Ethics* 2015 126(2): 257-282
- “A Dilemma for Calibrationism”  
*Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 2015 91(2):425-455
- “Permission to Believe: Why Permissivism is True and What it Tells Us About Irrelevant Influences on Belief”  
*Noûs* 2014 48(2):193-218
- “Chilling Out on Epistemic Rationality: A Defense of Imprecise Credences (and other imprecise doxastic attitudes)”  
*Philosophical Studies* 2012 158(2):197-219

### **Publications - Invited**

---

- “Internalism without Luminosity”  
*Philosophical Issues – Normativity* 2015 25(1): 252-272
- “Decision Making in the Face of Parity”  
*Philosophical Perspectives – Ethics* 2014 28(1): 263-277

### **Selected Presentations**

---

- Northeastern University – Formal and Experimental Philosophy Conference  
 “What Good is Imprecision?” (2019)
- Carnegie Mellon University – Colloquium  
 “Accuracy and Verisimilitude: The Good, The Bad and the Ugly” (2019)
- Fordham University – China/US Epistemology Conference  
 “Higher Order Evidence and the Perspective of Doubt” (2018)
- University of Mannheim – Suspension of Judgment Conference  
 “Higher Order Evidence and the Perspective of Doubt” (2018)
- Indiana University – Clark Lecture

“Higher Order Evidence and the Perspective of Doubt” (2018)  
 University of Oxford – Colloquium  
 “Defending Propriety” (2018)  
 University of Oxford – Global Priorities Institute  
 “What Good is Imprecision?” (2018)  
 University of Oxford – Knowledge, Belief, Evidence Conference  
 “Higher Order Evidence and the Perspective of Doubt” (2018)  
 Princeton University – Moral Epistemology Conference  
 “Higher Order Evidence and the Perspective of Doubt” (2018)  
 Cornell University – Colloquium  
 “What Good is Imprecision?” (2018)  
 Hebrew University – Colloquium  
 “What Good is Imprecision?” (2018)  
 Indiana University – Colloquium  
 “What Good is Imprecision?” (2017)  
 University of Barcelona – Epistemic Rationality: Conceptions & Challenges Conference  
 “Meditations on Beliefs Formed Arbitrarily” (2017)  
 Australian National University - Colloquium  
 “Meditations on Beliefs Formed Arbitrarily” (2017)  
 Rutgers Epistemology Conference  
 “Permissivism and the Value of Rationality” (2017)  
 University of Pittsburgh – Formal Representations of Ignorance Conference  
 “Beliefs Formed Arbitrarily” (2017)  
 Ranch Metaphysics Workshop  
 “Beliefs Formed Arbitrarily” (2017)  
 University of Pennsylvania – PeRFECt Conference  
 “Forming Beliefs Arbitrarily” (2016)  
 Tufts University – Colloquium  
 “Permissivism and the Value of Rationality” (2016)  
 Harvard University – Colloquium  
 “Permissivism and the Value of Rationality” (2016)  
 University of Bristol –Epistemic Utility Theory Project, Final Conference  
 “Permissivism and the Value of Rationality” (2016)  
 University of Toronto – Colloquium  
 “Permissivism, Disagreement and the Value of Rationality” (2016)  
 University of Michigan – Spring Colloquium  
 “Permissivism, Disagreement and the Value of Rationality” (2016).  
 City University of New York – Colloquium  
 “Permissivism, Disagreement and the Value of Rationality” (2016)  
 Rutgers University – Amsterdam/NYC Logic and Epistemology Workshop  
 “Conditionalization does not (in general) Maximize Expected Accuracy” (2015)  
 University of Bristol –Imprecise Credences Conference  
 “The Accuracy and Rationality of Imprecise Credences” (2015)  
 University of Colorado at Boulder - The Morris Colloquium on Cognitive Values  
 “The Accuracy and Rationality of Imprecise Credences” (2015)  
 Brandeis University – Higher Order Evidence Conference

“An Accuracy Based Approach to Higher Order Evidence” (2015)  
 University of Wisconsin at Madison - Colloquium  
 “Internalism without Luminosity” (2014)  
 University of North Carolina Chapel Hill - Colloquium  
 “Internalism without Luminosity” (2014)  
 University of Michigan – Formal Epistemology Mini-Conference  
 “The Accuracy and Rationality of Imprecise Credences” (2014)  
 Formal Epistemology Workshop (FEW)  
 “Bridging Rationality and Accuracy” (2014)  
 University of Konstanz – Konstanz Reasoning Conference  
 “An Accuracy Based Approach to Higher Order Evidence” (2014)  
 Princeton University - Colloquium  
 “Bridging Rationality and Accuracy” (2013)  
 University of North Carolina Chapel Hill – Epistemic Normativity Workshop  
 “Bridging Rationality and Accuracy” (2013)  
 University of St. Andrews *Arché* – Knowledge and Society Workshop  
 “A Dilemma for Calibrationism” (2013)  
 University of Leeds – Indeterminacy in What We Care About Workshop  
 “Moral Vagueness is Ontic Vagueness” (2013)  
 Fordham University – Epistemology and Ethics Workshop  
 “A Dilemma for Calibrationism” (2013)  
 University of St. Andrews *Arché* – Causes of Belief Workshop  
 “Two Notions of Epistemic Rationality” (2012)  
 Bellingham Summer Philosophy Conference  
 “Chilling Out on Epistemic Rationality” (2011)

### **Visiting Positions**

---

University of Oxford – *Global Priorities Institute* (Trinity 2018)  
 Australian National University (Summer 2017)  
 University of Oxford – *New Insights and Directions in Religious Epistemology* (Trinity 2013, 2014, 2015)

### **Awards and Fellowships**

---

Winner of the Marc Sanders Prize in Epistemology (2017)  
 Winner of the Young Epistemologist Prize (2017)  
 Bersoff Fellowship at New York University (2015-2017)  
 Teaching Award from *The Young People’s Project*

An organization which aims to create social change through math literacy (2011)

## **Academic Service**

---

Committee of Graduate Studies (MIT, 2017 - current)

Placement Officer, The University of Texas at Austin (2013, 2014)

Mentor for *Athena in Action* – A mentoring workshop for graduate student women in philosophy (2016)

Referee for the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, The European Research Council, The Council for the Humanities of the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research, Cambridge University Press, Routledge

Referee for *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, *British Journal of Philosophy Science*, *Ethics*, *Mind*, *Noûs*, *Philosopher's Imprint*, *Philosophical Review*, *Philosophical Studies*, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, *Philosophy of Science*, *The Journal of Philosophy* and others.

Co-organizer of the Texas Epistemology Extravaganza (2015)  
with Sinan Dogramaci and Sophie Horowitz

Co-organizer of the Bellingham Summer Philosophy Conference (2013)  
with Julia Markovits and Ned Markosian

## **Teaching**

---

### Undergraduate

Philosophy of Race and Gender

Contemporary Moral Problems

Introduction to Logic

Theory of Knowledge

### Graduate Seminars

Norms of Credence

With Roger White (MIT)

Epistemic Planning

With Jane Friedman (NYU)

Applications of Bayesianism to Traditional Epistemology

With Sinan Dogramaci (UT Austin)

From Metaethics to Metaepistemology

with Sinan Dogrmaci (UT Austin)

Higher Order Evidence (UT Austin)

Teaching Outside of the University

Logic Instructor at Norfolk Correctional Facility	<i>Boston University</i> (2019)
Tutor	<i>Tutoring Plus, Cambridge</i> (2018, 2019)
Logic Instructor at Fishkill Correctional Facility	<i>Bard Prison Initiative</i> (2017)
SAT Tutor	<i>New York Cares</i> (2015-2016)
High School Math Tutor	<i>The Young People's Project</i> (2010-2011)
English Teacher	AUA, Thailand (2006-2007)
Teaching Assistant for Mathematical Logic	<i>Center for Talented Youth</i> (Summer 2005)