Research 

Published/Forthcoming

Meditations on Beliefs Formed Arbitrarily

             Forthcoming in Oxford Studies in Epistemology

             Winner of the 2017 Sanders Prize in Epistemology

Permissivism and the Value of Rationality: A Challenge to the Uniqueness Thesis

            Forthcoming in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 

            Winner of the Young Epistemologist Prize 2017

An Accuracy Based Approach to Higher Order Evidence

             Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 2018 96(3): 690-715

 Conditionalization does not (in general) Maximize Expected Accuracy

                Mind 2017 126(504): 1155-1187 

The Accuracy and Rationality of Imprecise Credences*

                Noûs 2017 51(4): 667-685

Bridging Rationality and Accuracy

                  The Journal of Philosophy 2015 112(2): 633-657

Moral Vagueness is Ontic Vagueness

                 Ethics 2015 126(2): 257-282

Internalism without Luminosity

                 Philosophical Issues 2015 25(1): 252-272

A Dilemma for Calibrationism 

                   Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 2015 91(2): 425-55 

Permission to Believe: Why Permissivism is True and What it Tells Us about Irrelevant Influences on Belief

                   Noûs 2014, 48(2): 193-218

Decision Making in the Face of Parity

                  Philosophical Perspectives 2014, 28 (1): 263 -277

Chilling Out on Epistemic Rationality: A Defense of Imprecise Credences (and other imprecise doxastic attitudes)  

                  Philosophical Studies 2012, 158(2): 197-219


Writing for a General Audience

Interview with 3AM

A discussion of some of the themes in my research for a general audience

“Ants in Your Pants” 

A short piece on decision making for a blog about ants


Work in Progress (You’re welcome to cite, but if you’re using the paper for a significant purpose - such as assigning it for a class - please email me in case there’s a more recent version)


Works No Longer in Progress

Two Notions of Epistemic Rationality

My more developed views about about the two notions of rationality that I refer to in this paper are now in a paper titled “Bridging Rationality and Accuracy”  in The Journal of Philosophy. (See above).  This paper, however, provides a more informal characterization that gets at a similar idea.


*Note: there is an error in footnote 20 in the published version of “The Accuracy and Rationality of Imprecise Credences."  It is corrected in the version linked here.